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Most popular location-based social networks, such as Facebook and Foursquare, let their (mobile) users post location and
co-location (involving other users) information. Such posts bring social benefits to the users who post them but also to
their friends who view them. Yet, they also represent a severe threat to the users’ privacy, as co-location information
introduces interdependences between users. We propose the first game-theoretic framework to analyze and predict the
strategic behaviors, in terms of information sharing, of users of OSNs. In addition, in order to design parametric utility
functions that are representative of the users’ actual preferences, we conduct a survey of 250 Facebook users and use
conjoint analysis to quantify the users’ benefits of sharing vs. viewing (co)-location information and their preference for
privacy vs. benefits. We evaluate our framework through data-driven numerical simulations. We show how users’ individual
preferences influence each other’s decisions, we determine several factors that significantly affect these decisions (specifically
the considered adversary and the relative preference for privacy vs. benefits) for a better understanding of the users’ behaviors
and the interdependent privacy risks. Our findings are instrumental in the design of next-generation privacy protection
systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the advent of mobile networking, mobile users can easily connect to the Internet and determine their actual
locations with their smartphones, while on the go. Major online social network (OSN) providers, such as Facebook,
understood early on the interest users have in sharing their location jointly with their posts, pictures, etc. This
location-sharing feature has gained even more momentum as users increasingly access their favorite OSNs from
their smartphones (most Facebook check-ins and photos are made from mobile devices). Another popular feature,
currently implemented in many mobile location-based social networks, is the ability to mention other users, such
as friends, in posts or to tag them on pictures. Ilia et al. [20] perform a user study that demonstrates that 84.7% of
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posted pictures contain one or more face(s), whereas 87% contain one tag (users do not typically tag themselves)
and 12.2% contain more than one tag. In many cases, such information indicates that the users mentioned in
a post are co-located. As for location information, sharing co-location information–the fact that two users are
together (the actual location might not be known)–brings social benefits (as also pointed out by Krasnova et
al.[25]) to those sharing it but also to their friends who view it: Users enjoy knowing with whom their friends are
and telling their friends with whom they are.
However, these features also raise privacy concerns. Although it has been known for years that location
information leads to severe privacy issues–this has been extensively studied in the literature (e.g., [12, 26, 33];
see also FindYou [40], a location privacy auditing tool, available at https://find-you.herokuapp.com/), it was
only recently that the effect of co-location information on users’ location privacy was studied [34]. A critical
aspect of co-locations is that they relate to all the involved users (such information is co-owned by the involved
users [15, 45]) and introduce interdependences between the users’ location privacy, as the location information
disclosed by users affects the privacy of their friends. As such, users lose partial control over their privacy and it
becomes complex to predict the optimal sharing behavior. Such interdependent privacy risks are quite problematic
if users have different, possibly opposite, views about sharing and privacy: it creates so-called multi-party privacy
conflicts [45, 46].
Awareness about the interdependent nature of privacy is increasing, yet this is not explicitly addressed by
current laws, because of its complexity. Although opinion 5/2009 on online social networking produced by the
Working Party on Data Protection – which is an advisory board set up by the EU for the reform of the data
protection laws – raises awareness about the case of users uploading data about other individuals, even in the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Regulation EU 2016/679), recently adopted by the EU Parliament, the
case where individuals share data about individuals online is not directly mentioned, and the problem remains
unsolved. Therefore, from a legal perspective, there are little regulations that apply to sharing on OSNs (except
for the extreme case of sharing sexually explicit content) and this important problem deserves further study.
We propose the first unified framework for modeling the direct and indirect benefits, and the privacy impli-
cations of location and co-location sharing, in addition to the resulting strategic behaviors of the users. Such a
framework enables us to analyze and predict the behavior of users regarding location and co-location sharing
on OSNs. To this end, we build our framework using two well-established modeling and analytical tools: game
theory [14, 32, 48] and conjoint analysis [16]. Game theory enables us to model and formalize the users’ sharing
rationale and behavior. Such models include a number of parameters, typically in the expression of the users’
utility, that characterize the users’ behaviors. Conjoint analysis enables us to rigorously quantify, based on a
personalized user survey, the relative benefits of sharing and viewing location and co-location information,
and the associated relative costs in terms of location privacy. The values obtained through conjoint analysis
are used to derive the different parameters of the game-theoretic model. Although several works [7, 36] have
investigated interdependent privacy risks from a game-theoretic perspective (especially in the context of Facebook
applications), this is the first work that investigates the strategic aspects of (co)-location sharing in the presence of
interdependent privacy risks. Our framework could typically be used to gain insight into users’ sharing behavior
but also to design appropriate incentive mechanisms and location sharing features in order to influence the
behavior of OSN users, eventually optimizing the overall privacy-sharing trade-off.
Our contributions are as follows. We identify the important problem of location sharing with interdependent
privacy risks (introduced by co-location), namely the Sharing Game, and we propose the first game-theoretic
framework to formalize it. Following a conjoint analysis approach, we design and conduct a user survey of
Facebook users (N=250) to quantify users’ preferences of (1) sharing or viewing posts, (2) location or co-location
information, and (3) location privacy or sharing benefits. Our survey results indicate that, interestingly, there is
no consensus regarding users’ preferences: For instance, some users prefer sharing location information and
others prefer sharing co-location information. We evaluate our analytical framework through simulations, in a
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number of key experimental setups and scenarios. We use values of the parameters derived from the empirical
data, avoiding the pitfalls of purely theoretical results, for a better understanding of realistic human behaviors.
Our simulations notably unravel situations in which users can be forced into a vicious circle of sharing their
information or encouraged to over-share.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey the related work. In Section 3, we describe
the considered setting and the system model, including the users and the adversary, as well as the proposed
framework for studying users’ sharing behaviors. In Section 4, we describe the methodology and the results of
the survey of Facebook users in order to estimate the key parameters of our model. In Section 5, we evaluate our
framework in a number of scenarios. In Section 6, we discuss directions for improvement and extension of our
work. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper and we discuss future work.
2 RELATED WORK
Our work is related to two broad research areas: information sharing on OSN and interdependent privacy with
game theory.
2.1 Information Sharing on OSNs: Privacy & Utility
Users share large amounts of information, including location, co-location and photos, with their friends on OSNs;
this comes with privacy risks. Deciding whether to share information (and the precision at which the information
is shared), is a complex process. It involves many factors including the users’ contexts, the visibility of the
shared information (i.e., who has access to it and the relationship between the user who shares the information
and the users who can access it [47, 51]), the shared information itself, and the benefits and privacy risks [50]
associated with sharing. In some cases, the happiness of a user’s friends also becomes part of the decision process;
this is usually captured through a so-called altruistic factor, as introduced in [30] and experimentally measured
using techniques based on conjoint analysis in [37, 38]. Conjoint analysis studies were also used to quantify
the value which users attribute to their friends’ information in the context of app adoption (e.g., in [39]). In
practice, deciding whether to share information often comes down to finding a sweet spot between privacy
and benefits [56]. The decision process can be automated by (1) maximizing privacy under benefits (service
quality) constraints [43] (or conversely), (2) taking a game-theoretic approach for modeling the interplay between
the users and the adversaries [42], or (3) by mimicking the users’ sharing decisions using machine-learning
techniques, after a training phase [8]. In our work, we model decision making as the optimization of a utility
function that incorporates both benefits and privacy. One of our contributions is to parametrize this function by
applying conjoint analysis on user data collected through a targeted survey. Also, as users’ decisions affect those
of other users, we follow a game-theoretic approach for modeling the interplay between users and, ultimately,
their decisions.
2.2 Interdependent Privacy & Game Theory
The notion of interdependent privacy, i.e., how actions performed by one user affect the privacy of another, was first
formalized by Biczók and Chia [7]. Interdependent privacy raises the following concern: Users’ privacy is no longer
under their sole control. Numerous real-life examples of interdependent privacy risks were studied in the literature,
including information about users’ friends accessed by Facebook apps [7, 36], sensitive attributes inferred from
those of a users’ friends on OSNs [4, 13, 31], demographic information inferred from a user’s interests [10],
genomic data inferred from that of a user’s relatives [18, 19], location leaked from geo-tagged pictures that
friends upload online [17], relationships inferred from pictures [44], and co-locations detected from the users’
IP address at hotspots [49] or reported on OSNs [34]. From a social perspective, a large body of work has been
devoted to the study of users’ individual and collaborative coping mechanisms for multi-party privacy conflicts
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related to co-owned data (also referred to as regulation of interpersonal boundaries) [6, 11, 21, 27, 45, 46, 52, 55].
These works focus mostly on the case of photos sharing on online social platforms and take an experimental and
empirical approach to the problem–i.e., they rely on interviews and surveys. Game theory is a first class candidate
tool for studying the interactions between users who are subject to interdependent privacy risks, as it enables the
modeling of the effect of users’ strategies on other users’ utility, as well as the users’ decision making process. It
was successfully used to analyze users’ application adoption behaviors [7, 36], privacy decision-making [1], such
as sharing genomic data [19]. The study of interdependent privacy risks from an economic perspective follows
the long line of research on interdependent security games surveyed in [28].
Our work is the first to study the interactions between OSN users in the case of (co-)location sharing, where
shared co-locations create interdependent privacy risks. Unlike the game-theoretic approaches surveyed above,
we take into account the time dimension by considering a repeated game, which introduces singular behaviors.
In addition, we rely on a rigorous approach, based on user surveys, to determine realistic values of the different
parameters of our model.
3 SYSTEM MODEL & FORMALIZATION
We consider a mobile location-based online social network (OSN) with standard sharing features. Users are
mobile and located within a given geographical region of interest (typically the same city) and time is discrete. At
some point in time, t , by checking-in at a given location, a user can post information about her location on her
OSN profile. She can also post co-location information by tagging a close friend in a picture, or in a status update,
thus making this information available to the OSN provider, all her friends and all her tagged friend’s friends.
Figure 1 illustrates an example of this behavior. In turn, a tagged user can “un-tag” herself from a post in which
she is tagged, making this information unavailable to all users but not to the OSN provider. Sharing brings not
only social benefits, but also location privacy implications, for both the user who shared the information and her
tagged friend.
At any time t , an adversary–either the service provider or the friends of one or both of these two users–has
access to previously reported locations and co-locations and can use this information to infer the users’ locations
at time t . We propose a framework in which, at any time, the decision to post location and co-location information,
and the decision to allow a friend to post co-location information, is made strategically by both the users involved.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Illustrative screenshots of location (a) and co-location (b) sharing on an online social network (Facebook). These are
pictures from the public Facebook profile of Mark Zuckerberg.
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si (t) = (sli (t), sci (t)) Strategy of user i at time t
L¯ or sl ·(t) = 0 (False) Hide location
L or sl ·(t) = 1 (True) Share location
C¯ or sc ·(t) = 0 (False) Hide co-location
C or sc ·(t) = 1 (True) Share co-location
s∗(t) =
(
s∗i (t), s∗j (t)
)
Equilibrium strategy profiles (decisions) at time t
Bi
(
t , si (t), sj (t)
)
User i’s benefits at time t for strategies
(
si (t), sj (t)
)
bisl User i’s benefit of sharing her actual location
bivl User i’s benefit of viewing her friend’s location
bisc User i’s benefit of sharing co-location with a friend
bivc User i’s benefit of viewing co-loc. shared by a friend
f isv User i’s preference factor: sharing vs. viewing
f ilc User i’s preference factor: location vs. co-location
f ipb or αi User i’s preference factor: privacy vs. benefits
si (·) = {si , s∗i (t − 1), . . . } User i’s past decisions and a possible strategy, si , at t
Pi
(
t , si (·), sj (·),B
)
User i’s privacy at time t for strategies
(
si (·), sj (·)
)
ui
(
t , si (·), sj (·)
)
User i’s utility at time t for strategies
(
si (·), sj (·)
)
αi Weight with which user i values privacy over benefits
SW (t , si (·), sj (·)) Social welfare at time t for strategies
(
si (·), sj (·)
)
Table 1. Table of notations.
3.1 Game Theory 101
Game theory is the study of the strategic interaction between multiple rational decision-makers who aim to
maximize their own utility [14, 32, 48]. This mathematical theory enables us to derive more than the optimal
strategy that a rational agent would adopt given various parameters: It enables the modeling and prediction
of stable states, called equilibria, in which none of the agents can improve his utility given all other agents’
utility functions and strategies. It has been notably used in economics, biology, political science, psychology, and
computer science. Game theory is especially relevant for our work as it enables us to model and analyze users’
preferences and interactions, and to predict their resulting rational behaviors. A core concept of game theory is
the Nash equilibrium (NE), which represents the stable state in which no agent (a so-called player), by taking into
account other players’ strategies (so-called opponents), has incentive to deviate from his strategy. A refinement
of the NE is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). This refers to an equilibrium derived by considering a
smaller part of the whole game tree, by eliminating incredible threats (strategies that would not rationally be
chosen). A common method for finding a SPNE is called backward induction; it first considers the last actions of
the game and derives the best decision of the last player, given all other previous possible decisions in the game.
Social welfare is defined as the sum of the utilities of all players. A strategy profile (set of players’ strategies) is
called social optimum if it maximizes the social welfare. Note that a NE is not necessarily a social optimum, but
that finding a socially-optimal NE is highly desirable.
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3.2 User Model
We model the interactions between a user and one of her close friends (also called players) as a game over a time
window of interest ({1, . . . ,T }), called the Sharing Game.1 The strategy of a user i at time t , denoted by si (t), is
chosen from any possible combinations of decisions to share or not to share her own location and her possible
co-location with her friend. We denote si (t) ≜ (sli (t), sci (t)), where sli (t) and sci (t) are binary variables that
represent whether user i shares location and co-location, respectively. For alternate more compact notations, we
use L¯ for sli (t) = 0, L for sli (t) = 1, C¯ for sci (t) = 0 and C for sci (t) = 1. When the two players are co-located,
each of them can choose any combination of the four possible strategies: L¯C¯ – sharing nothing, L¯C – sharing
only the co-location information, LC¯ – sharing only the location information or LC – sharing both. However,
when the users are not co-located they can only choose whether to share their own location, choosing between
two possible strategies: L¯C¯ – sharing nothing and LC¯ – sharing location information.
The social benefits of user i , which stem from a decision to share information at some time t are denoted by
Bi (t , si (t), sj (t)), where j denotes the other user. Her privacy at t , denoted by Pi (t , si (·), sj (·),B), is a function of
both users’ strategies at times {t −k, ..., t}, where k ∈ {0, . . . , t −1} denotes the number of previous time instants
the adversary uses to gather reported information. The privacy function can incorporate specific background
user information (denoted by B), e.g., her mobility profile. Although we consider that a user’s benefits at some
time only depend on the users’ strategies at that time, we emphasize that the privacy function takes into account
previous time instants as well. In other words, a decision made at time t has privacy implications at later time
instants.
The utility function of a player at time instant t captures both her social benefits and her privacy and we
assume a player is only interested in the privacy at the current time she has to make a decision, t .
ui (t , si (·), sj (·)) = (1 − αi )Bi
(
t , si (t), sj (t)
)
+ αiPi (t , si (·), sj (·),B) (1)
where · denotes the times {t − k, ..., t} and αi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the weight with which user i values her privacy
over her social benefits. Note that, in the decision making process, players can be assisted by a tool to evaluate the
privacy implications, namely the value P.(·), of each of their decision regarding sharing–for instance, a Facebook
extension would suggest this, thus complete information would be available to the players in the decision making
process.
At any t , a player’s social benefits are computed as a normalized sum of the benefits of sharing information
(i.e., location and co-location) and viewing information shared by her friend, specifically,
Bi (t , si (t), sj (t)) =
bislsli (t) + biscsci (t) + bivlslj (t) + bivcsc j (t)
bisl + b
i
sc + b
i
vl + b
i
vc
(2)
where bisl and b
i
sc denote user i’s benefit of sharing location and co-location and bivl and b
i
vc her benefit of viewing
location and co-location. Note that these parameters are specific to a user.
The game is played repeatedly, at successive time instants, from 1 to T . At every time instant, we model the
interactions as a perfect and complete information, non-cooperative, extensive form game. This type of game
corresponds to the interactions in a typical OSN, where the players’ actions at some instant are inherently ordered:
The second player (or his application implementing the decision model) knows the choice of the first one and
decides (or suggests the player) her strategy accordingly. Therefore, without loss of generality, we consider that
the players’ actions are ordered at every time instant. In reality, players would also play such a game successively
over time (for each sharing action), hence our choice of a repeated game.
We list the following assumptions, that properly model the existing OSNs’ interfaces (such as Facebook’s):
(1) Location posts of a player are visible to all her friends and to the service provider. (2) Co-location posts
1Note that the adversary, with respect to whom the users’ privacy is evaluated (typically the service provider), is not a player of the game.
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initiated by either of the two players are always visible to the service provider and cannot be removed (even if
the second player removes them, the service provider still has this information). (3) For a co-location post to
be visible to friends of the two players, both of them have to agree to share it, in which case it is visible to the
union of their friends. (4) If a player un-shares a co-location shared by the first player (by un-tagging or even
asking it to be removed), the first player cannot share that co-location again. (5) Decisions made by the players
are considered fixed: Once they strategically choose the best decisions at time t , they will not revisit them at later
time instants. Table 1 summarizes the notations used in our formalism.
We are aware of the fact that some people might act irrationally, especially when it comes to privacy-related
decisions [3]. Yet, we believe that privacy protection demand will increase, notably because a growing number of
people suffer the consequences of their (and others’) privacy carelessness. Moreover, smartphones are increasingly
involved in the sharing decisions users make, as demonstrated by the growing sophistication of the apps’
permission systems. A privacy-protection software run for this purpose can be “rational” and strictly follow the
parametrization model provided by its user to aid him in decision making. It is therefore of high interest to see
what happens under the assumption of rationality.
3.3 Adversarial Models
Although the adversary is not a player in our game, the privacy of the players depends on who the adversary is:
For the same strategy profile, different adversaries have access to all or only some of the shared information. We
consider four possible adversaries, specifically the service provider and three different sets of users, essentially
subsets of the players’ friends. Note that these are all adversaries that our survey participants report being
concerned about and we considered the adversaries and the information that is available to them for the typical
default privacy settings for OSN posts.
3.3.1 Service Provider adversarial model (SP). The service provider adversary has access to all location and
co-location posts made by the players. The specificity of this adversary is that, once either of the players shares
information, this information is always known to him. In other words, the second player cannot un-share
co-location information with respect to the service provider. We assume that the SP does not gather location
information about its users (i.e., the players) through other channels, such as from their IP address.2
3.3.2 Friends adversarial models (MF, FF, CF). In these adversarial models, privacy is computed from the
perspective of the players’ friends. The common point of these models is that, unlike the SP model, co-location
information potentially shared by the first player can be removed by the second one (e.g., by un-tagging). Figure 2
illustrates the valid set of players’ strategies in this case. We consider three different subsets of the friends, based
on the information available to each of them, as illustrated in Figure 3: (i) “My other friends model” (MF)–this
adversary has access to all the location posts made by the player and to co-location posts made by both players; (ii)
“My friend’s other friends model” (FF)–this adversary has access to all the location and co-location posts made by
the other player and to co-location posts made by the player; and (iii) “Our friends in common model” (CF)–this
adversary has access to all location and co-location posts made by both players. Note that the FF adversary can
also be representative (with a possibly higher value for α ·) for a public adversary–while this is not the default
visibility for posts, users can post information with public visibility.
3.4 Analysis Methodology
At each time instant, t , we use backward induction, a typical method for finding a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) that dictates the players’ decisions. Equilibria decisions made at time instants prior to t ,
denoted by s∗(t ′) =
(
s∗i (t ′), s∗j (t ′)
)
, where t − k ≤ t ′ < t , are used when computing the privacy of the players.
2This could be achieved by simply incorporating such side information in the privacy evaluation function.
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User i
User j
L¯C¯ L¯C LC¯ LC
L¯C¯
User j
L¯C¯ L¯C LC¯ LC
L¯C
User j
L¯C¯ L¯C LC¯ LC
LC¯
User j
L¯C¯ L¯C LC¯ LC
LC
Fig. 2. Possible strategies for one time instant of the Sharing Game in the friends adversarial models (depicted in Figure 3).
User i is the first player (he chooses a strategy first) and user j the second player (he reacts to i’s choice). Only the black solid
strategies are valid when the two users are not co-located. All strategies (including the gray dashed ones) are valid when the
two players are co-located. Horizontal arrows indicate the fact that the second player can revert a co-location shared by the
first player (e.g., by un-tagging herself or asking that the post be removed), hence choosing not to share the co-location.
Therefore, when co-located, only strategy profiles in which the players agree whether or not to share their co-location are
valid.
(a) MF (b) FF (c) CF
Fig. 3. Friends adversarial models (hashed area) for user i : (a) My other friends model (MF); (b) My friend’s other friends
model (FF); (c) Our friends in common model (CF). The social circle of user i (resp. j) is represented by the left (resp. right)
circle. Their intersection represents the common friends of i and j.
The first player, player i , anticipates the second player’s (player j’s) best response, as a function of her possible
strategies si , essentially
∀si , s∗j (si ) = arg maxs uj (t , si , s, s
∗(t − 1), ..., s∗(t − k)) (3)
where s∗(t − 1), ..., s∗(t − k) denote the users’ past decisions.
This eliminates incredible outcomes that player j would never rationally choose. Player i chooses her best
strategy out of the remaining outcomes, as follows
s∗i = arg maxs ui
(
t , s, s∗j (s), s∗(t − 1), ..., s∗(t − k)
)
(4)
The equilibrium decisions at time t are then given by
s∗(t) =
(
s∗i (t), s∗j (t)
)
=
(
s∗i , s
∗
j (s∗i )
)
(5)
We define social welfare, at some time t , as the sum of the players’ utilities, for any strategy profile, specifically
SW (t , si (·), sj (·)) = ui (t , si (·), sj (·)) + uj (t , si (·), sj (·)) (6)
In case of multiple equilibria at time t , the players coordinate and choose the one that maximizes their social
welfare. The game is repeated in a similar way at successive time instants, each time taking into account the
players’ decisions from previous time instants.
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3.5 Equilibria Properties
We are interested in different properties for the players’ equilibria decisions.
3.5.1 Social-optimality at equilibrium. We say that the social welfare is maximized for the equilibrium decisions
at time t (or, equivalently, that the equilibrium at time t is socially-optimal) if the following property holds:
∀ (si (t), sj (t)) , (s∗i (t), s∗j (t)) :
SW
(
t , s∗i (t), s∗j (t), s∗(t − 1), ..., s∗(t − k)
)
≥ SW (t , si (t), sj (t), s∗(t − 1), ..., s∗(t − k)) (7)
3.5.2 Individual utility maximization at equilibrium. A player’s i utility is maximized for the equilibrium
decisions at time t if the following property holds:
∀ (si (t), sj (t)) , (s∗i (t), s∗j (t)) :
ui
(
t , s∗i (t), s∗j (t), s∗(t − 1), ..., s∗(t − k)
)
≥ ui
(
t , si (t), sj (t), s∗(t − 1), ..., s∗(t − k)
)
(8)
We consider the proportion of time instants, across {1,. . . ,T} for which the equilibria decisions are socially-
optimal and the proportion of time instants for which the equilibria decisions maximize each player’s utility.
4 SURVEY
The model presented in the previous section includes a number of parameters that appear in the expression of
the utility function that drives the users’ strategic behaviors. As such, these parameters characterize the users’
sharing behaviors; in practice, they vary from one user to another. In order to obtain realistic values of these
parameters, as well as to study the general trend and the variability across users, we conducted a survey of
Facebook users in 2016.
4.1 Conjoint Analysis 101
We briefly introduce the conjoint analysis technique in this paragraph, which can be skipped by the knowledgeable
reader. Conjoint analysis [16] is an experimental approach used to detect the hidden rules users rely on to make
decisions (involving trade-offs) between services. In this approach, a service is viewed as a combination of
attributes, each of which has different levels (values). Users are asked to rank multiple versions of the service
(each being a different combination of attribute levels). The combination of attributes and levels can lead to a
large number of versions to be ranked. In order to keep the complexity of this task manageable for the users, the
number of proposed versions can be reduced, in an optimal way, to a reasonable yet meaningful number, through
fractional factorial design [29]. The hidden value users place on each of the attribute levels is then quantified
through statistical analysis, as part-worth utilities and importance values. The importance values represent how
much difference each attribute makes in the total utility of the service.
4.2 Methodology
We recruited participants through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. To be eligible, they were required
to have a minimum Human Intelligence Task (HIT) approval rate of 95% with at least 100 past approved HITs
and an active Facebook account. We checked this last criterion by using the “Log-in with Facebook” feature. We
only use the information about the participants’ Facebook account for screening purposes and we did not store
any such information; we made this point very clear in the advertisement page of our survey (in order to not
discourage privacy-concerned potential participants).
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After the standard demographic questions (part I), we polled the survey participants about their preferences
regarding the posts they share or view on social networks (part II). The second part of the survey was composed
of three questions to assess the participants’ preferences regarding, respectively, (1) sharing vs. viewing posts
with location information (i.e., check-in posts), (2) sharing posts with location information vs. sharing posts with
co-location information, and (3) location privacy vs. benefits of sharing location information. We designed these
three survey questions by following a rigorous full-profile conjoint analysis approach [16] and making use of a
dedicated tool, namely XLSTAT [53]
This approach enables us to quantify individual values for each of the participants’ preferences factors.
Sharing vs. Viewing (fsv ). After a brief reminder about what a check-in post is (illustrated with a screenshot of
a Facebook timeline), the participants were told that, for technical reasons, some of their own two most-recent
check-in posts and some of their friends’ two most-recent check-in posts might be removed from Facebook. Then,
the participants were asked to rank by preference a number of scenarios corresponding to different combinations
of the numbers of posts kept (e.g., “two of your recent posts are kept and one of your friend’s recent posts is kept”,
“none of your recent posts is kept and one of your friend’s recent posts is kept”). The participants were asked
to take into account only benefit considerations (i.e., not privacy). In order to limit the bias coming from the
content of the posts, we explicitly mentioned that these are all the posts that they once shared and they would
like to keep, and we did not include the content of the participants’ actual recent posts in the survey page. The
initial ordering of these options was randomized. For this question, two attributes were used: the number of
the participant’s own kept check-in posts and the number of the participant’s friends’ kept check-in posts. Each
attribute had three possible values (i.e., none, one or two). This yielded an optimal number of five options to rank
(out of a total of nine). In order to detect sloppy answers, we included in the list of options to be ordered a sixth
option in which no posts are removed, and we explicitly stated in the text of the question that this should be the
preferred option. The ranking provided by the users enabled us to compute their preference factors 0 ≤ fsv ≤ 1,
from the importance values attributed to each attribute: fsv is the normalized importance value of the attribute
own posts, whereas 1 − fsv is the normalized importance value of the attribute friends’ posts. A value greater than
0.5 denotes a preference for sharing information over viewing information.
Location vs. Co-location (flc ). This question was designed by following the same methodology as for the first
question: After a brief reminder about what a co-location post is (illustrated with screenshots), the participants
were asked to order, according to their preferences, six options in which a number of their own recent posts with
location information and a number of their own recent posts with co-location information would be removed
(e.g., “two of your recent check-in posts are kept and one of your recent co-location posts is kept.”). The ranking
provided by the users enabled us to compute their preference factors flc , similarly to fsv .
Location privacy vs. Sharing benefits (fpb ). After a brief reminder about location privacy, the participants
were asked to order, according to preference, six options with different numbers of check-in posts and the
corresponding levels of location privacy, in terms of the average precision with which their location can be
inferred during a day (e.g., “12 location posts for an average location privacy of 400 m”). These numbers were
extracted from the experimental results presented in [34]. The ranking provided by the users enabled us to
compute their preference factors fpb , similarly to fsv .
Finally (part III), we polled the participants about their usage of Facebook, their privacy concerns, and about their
knowledge of the privacy threats related to (co)-location information. The transcript of the questionnaire is shown
at the end of the manuscript and aggregated results are available at https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/218755.
It took approximately ten minutes to complete the survey; the participants were paid $2 for their work. We
ruled out participants with inconsistent responses in part II. More specifically, we considered as inconsistent a
ranking that violates the natural order, i.e., considering that removing some of the existing posts is preferable to
keeping them all. In the end, we obtained a sample of N = 250 valid participants; the sample was diverse and
balanced in terms of the participants’ demographics: 46% of the participants were female, the participants had
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 0.
The Sharing Game: Benefits and Privacy Implications of (Co)-Location Sharing with Interdependences • 0:11
various primary areas of employments, and their ages ranged from 19 to 68 years old, with an average of 33 and
a standard deviation of 9.48. The participants were active Facebook users: 70% of the participants declared that
they use Facebook multiple times per day (93% do so multiple times per week), 30% of them make at least one
post with location information per week, and 37% of them make at least one post with co-location information
(in statuses, in posts or in pictures) per week.
4.3 Results
We extracted the aforementioned three preference factors from the survey data by using XLSTAT. Note that,
due to the fact that only a limited number of scenarios can be presented to the participants for ordering, the
preference factors can take only a limited number of values. We illustrate the relevant statistics in Table 2 and in
Figure 4. Note that these results should be taken with a grain of salt as previous works (e.g., [2, 22]) have shown
that (reported) privacy attitudes do not always correspond to actual behaviors. We observe that the average of
the factors is close (yet slightly higher) than 0.5 (specifically, .57 ± .15, .56 ± .15 and .60 ± .39 for fsv , flc and fpb ,
respectively); this means that there is no strong consensus among the participants regarding their preferences. In
fact, the distributions of the factor values are bi-modal: Users tend to have a clear preference for one of the two
options (e.g., location vs. co-location). This phenomenon appears clearly for fpb (i.e., privacy vs. benefits) that
has a high standard deviation (0.39). In the case of fsv , for instance, the proportion of indifferent users (for whom
fsv = 0.5) is substantial (16.8%) and almost as large as the proportion of users who prefer viewing over sharing
(23.2%). These results are in line with those of previous studies that showed that there exist multiple usage profiles
on social networks: Some users connect to social networks mostly to share news with their friends whereas
others do so mostly to view news about their friends [5, 35]. 54% of the users prefer location to co-location
information (flc > 0.5) and 20% do not have a preference (flc = 0.5), whereas 63.2% favor privacy over social
benefits (fpb > 0.5).
fsv flc fpb
avg. ± stddev. .57 ± .15 .56 ± .15 .60 ± .39
proportion of users with f∗ > 0.5 (prefer sharing/ location/ privacy) 60% 54% 63.2%
proportion of users with f∗ = 0.5 (indifferent) 16.8% 20% N/A
proportion of users with f∗ < 0.5 (prefer viewing/ co-location/ benefits) 23.2% 26% 36.8%
Table 2. User preference factors extracted from the survey data by using a conjoint-analysis approach. f∗ denotes, depending
on the column, fsv , flc , or fpb .
As for the questions related to privacy issues on Facebook, 24.8% of the participants declared being “very
concerned” about privacy, 50% declared being “moderately concerned” and 25.2% not concerned (as illustrated in
Figure 5a). When the participants report being co-located with a friend (say Bob), their feared adversaries are Bob’s
friends who are not friends with the participant (i.e., the FF model, 44% of the participants), the common friends
of Bob and the participant (i.e., the CF model, 24.4%), Facebook (i.e., the SP model, 24.4%) and the participants’
friends who are not friends with Bob (i.e., the MF model, 21.2%), as illustrated in Figure 5b; 26% of the participants
reported not being concerned by any of these adversaries. 42.4% of the participants were not aware that their
friends’ posts that include location or co-location information can decrease their own location privacy. Only 50%
of the participants declared being aware that their posts have privacy implications for themselves and for their
friends, whereas 30.8% of the participants were not aware that their posts have any effect on privacy (as illustrated
in Figure 6). Finally, we asked the participants whether the survey would affect their future sharing behavior on
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Fig. 4. CDFs of the preference factors of our survey participants.
 Very
 concerned
24.8%
 Moderately
 concerned
50.0%
 Not
 concerned
25.2%
(a)
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
CFMF FF SP None
%
 o
f u
se
rs
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
(b)
Fig. 5. (a) Users’ concern about location privacy; (b) The adversaries that users are concerned about: Our friends in common
(CF), My other friends (MF), My friend’s other friends (FF), The service provider (SP).
Facebook: A substantial fraction of the participants (around 35%) declared they would be more careful, especially
for co-location information, by, for instance, preventing their friends from tagging them in posts:
“I may remove tags or ask friends not to tag me with locations in the future.” (female, 35 y/o)
“I may think twice before checking in, or at least consider the impact tagging others has on their
privacy.” (male, 31 y/o)
“Yes because I was unaware of this issue and it now makes me a little scared.” (male, 19 y/o)
Of the participants who stated that their behavior would not change, 31% declared already being careful with
their posts and tags.
An anonymized and sanitized version of the answers (part II and some of part III) is available (password FbS250)
at https://www.dropbox.com/s/4ukfg5nbhd1x0p7/data.zip?dl=1.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate our framework by simulating and analyzing the users’ sharing decisions in different experimental
setups.
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Fig. 6. Users’ awareness about (a) privacy risks stemming from their own posts; (b) own privacy risks stemming from friends’
posts.
Fig. 7. Scenario considered in the evaluation: Two users, Alice (dotted) and Bob (dashed), coming from distinct directions,
meet for some time, and later separate in distinct directions.
5.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the experimental setup of the different building blocks of our framework.
5.1.1 Quantification of the users’ privacy. We quantify users’ privacy (P.) as their location privacy, by relying
on the inference framework proposed by Olteanu et al. [34]3; we re-use the corresponding formalism and software
library. In short, we assume discrete locations (i.e., the geographical area of interest is partitioned into cells by
using a regular square grid; when reporting their locations, users report the cells in which their actual locations
fall; and the adversary has access to the users’ mobility profiles in the form of transition probabilities between
cells). Privacy is computed as the adversary’s expected error when localizing users, using a junction tree exact
inference algorithm on the Bayesian network [23] that models the probabilistic dependencies between all the
users’ locations over the time period of interest. The location and co-location disclosures available to the adversary
depend on the considered adversary, among those presented in Section 3.3, namely the SP, MF, FF, and CF models,
and on the users’ strategic decisions. For the sake of simplicity, we consider the same adversary for both users:
3Note that our model is flexible enough to allow the use of other frameworks for inferring location privacy, for instance, that proposed by Xu
et al. [54].
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For example, if the first user’s location privacy is computed with respect to the OSN service provider, so is that
of the other user. At each time instant t , the adversary considers all past location and co-location posts from
the users when inferring their locations. Note that, in practice, users are not yet able to evaluate their privacy
accurately, but this aspect could be provided to them by the OSN or by a software module (e.g., in a mobile app).
5.1.2 Users’ parameters. We rely on the results of our user survey to parametrize the users’ utility function.
More specifically, we derive the value of the parameters α , bsl , bsc , bvl and bvc from the values of the preference
factors fpb , flc and fsv . To do so in a coherent way and keep the number of parameters low, we make a few
evaluation assumptions: We assume that (1) the users’ preferences between sharing and viewing is the same for
posts with location information as for posts with co-location information, (2) the users’ preferences between
posts with location information and posts with co-location information is the same for the users’ own posts as for
their friends’ posts. Using these assumptions, we derive the values of the parameters from the preference factors
(of which we consider different values in each experiment) as follows: α = fpb , bsc = fsv1−fsv bvc , bvl =
flc
1−flc bvc ,
bsl =
fsv
1−fsv ·
flc
1−flc bvc where bvc is a free variable (we set it to 1).
5.1.3 Scenario. In order to evaluate our framework and to gain insight about the effects of the different
parameters, we consider the canonical meeting scenario, illustrated in Figure 7: Two users, Alice and Bob, coming
from distinct locations (t = 1), meet for some time (one time unit, t = 2), and later separate in distinct directions
(t > 2). We consider T = 5 time instants in total. At each time instant, both Alice and Bob can either report or
hide their actual location. Additionally, at t = 2, either of them can choose to report being co-located with the
other. The adversary uses, in the inference process, all the users’ reports and the same basic mobility profile for
Alice and for Bob: In one time unit, Alice/Bob either stays in the cell she/he is in (with probability .5) or moves
to one of the neighboring cells (with the remaining equal probabilities). The rationale behind this choice is to
understand the basics of the interplay between the users, independently from the specifics and the singularities
of their individual data.
5.2 Experimental Results
In order to understand the effect of each of our model’s parameters, we study through simulations the different
strategic decisions players choose in several situations4.
5.2.1 The effect of the considered privacy adversary. We study how the adversary that is considered by the
players when assessing their privacy influences their decisions. In a first experiment, we consider a homogeneous
scenario, in which the parameters in both the users’ utility are set using the average values of fsv , flc and fpb
obtained in our survey, as presented in Figure 4. Figure 8 illustrates the different game outcomes, for the four
adversarial models we presented in Section 3.3. A first observation is that the players’ decisions are quite diverse,
thus demonstrating that the adversarial model can influence what players share.
In the SP and CF models (Figures 8a and 8b), at t = 1 (when no co-location has yet been reported and thus
there is no correlation between the users’ locations or their privacy), the equilibrium decisions are that nothing
be shared–the first blue rectangle and red circle pair. Note that for all time instants where users are not co-located
(t , 2), the equilibrium decisions can only be "share nothing" or "share location". The equilibrium at t = 1
maximizes social welfare (there is a green triangle for t = 1), but either of the players would have a higher
utility (both the blue rectangle and the red circle are empty) if the other one shared his own location (because,
in the current absence of correlation, they would enjoy viewing where their friend is without any privacy cost
to themselves). However, such an outcome is not an equilibrium because neither of them wants to share their
location at this time (mainly due to the fact that the social benefit gained by sharing location would be less than
4More situations are described in our technical report [reference will be available for the final version]
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Bob’s utility is not maximized
Social welfare is maximized
(b) “CF” model
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(c) “MF” model
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Fig. 8. Players’ decisions at equilibrium,
(
s∗Alice (t), s∗Bob (t)
)
, for fsv = 0.57, flc = 0.56, fpb = 0.60 and different adversarial
models: (a) Service Provider (SP), (b) Our friends in common (CF), (c) My other friends (MF), (d) My friend’s other friends (FF)
models. The x axis shows the time window of interest. On the y axis, for every time instant, Alice’s decision is represented
by a blue rectangle and Bob’s decision by a red circle. A player’s corresponding shape is full if its utility at equilibrium is
maximized, and empty otherwise. Additionally, each time instant is marked by a green triangle, if the equilibrium decisions
maximize social welfare.
their incurred privacy loss, weighted by 1− α and α , respectively). At time t = 2, when the players are co-located,
the additional benefit of sharing a co-location along with the benefit of sharing a location, overcomes the privacy
loss; and the players’ equilibrium decisions are that everything be shared (LC,LC). This equilibrium not only
maximizes social welfare, but also gives the best utility for both of the players at this time. Once these decisions
to share have been made at t = 2, the privacy at t = 3 is already substantially compromised; hence the benefit of
sharing location overcomes the (now) small relative privacy loss and both players choose to share everything,
that is, their own locations. Similarly, the decision to share a location at t = 3 affects a player’s privacy at t = 4
severely enough that they again decide to share their location (for the social benefits) and this effect propagates
at successive time instants.
In the MF model (Figure 8c), there is a different equilibrium at the time of co-location, t = 2. The outcome
where both players share everything, (LC,LC) is still the one that maximizes social welfare, but it is no longer an
equilibrium because each of the players can now deviate from it by not sharing their own location to achieve
better privacy, hence utility (e.g., outcome (LC, L¯C) would be better for Bob than outcome (LC,LC), because his
adversary–his friends who are not Alice’s friends–cannot see that Alice also shares her location). This was not
the case in the SP model, where information shared by either player is automatically seen by the provider). In this
case, the equilibrium is outcome (L¯C, L¯C): Sharing only a co-location does come with a small privacy cost (privacy
can decrease even when only co-location and no location information is available due to the mobility profiles, as
demonstrated in [34]), but this loss is smaller than the benefit gained by sharing. This equilibrium maximizes
neither the social welfare nor a player’s utility (either of them would have a better utility if the other would
share their location, because they enjoy viewing where their friend is, at no privacy cost to themselves). At time
t = 3, the players’ privacy is higher than it was in the SP and CF models–for any strategy profile–because the
decisions made at t = 2 provide the adversary with less information. Sharing the location is not justified because,
in this case, the privacy cost this would bring is higher than the benefit gain, hence the equilibrium decisions
are that nothing be shared. This equilibrium does not maximize players’ utilities (each would still prefer to see
the other’s location at no privacy cost) or the social welfare. This effect is propagated over time, at successive
time instants, and the equilibria decisions are the same, that nothing be shared. Furthermore, as the effect of
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Fig. 9. Players’ decisions at equilibrium, aggregated over time for fsv = 0.57, flc = 0.56, and different adversarial models:
Service Provider (SP)–first row, Our friends in common (CF)–second row, My other friends (MF)–third row, My friend’s other
friends (FF)–forth row models. For each adversarial model and each possible combination of values for αAlice and αBob ,
eight heatmaps (left four for Alice, right four for Bob) indicate the percentage of times, aggregated over the number of time
instants, that a player made one of the four possible decisions: "share nothing", "share location", "share co-location" or "share
both" (in all combinations αAlice -αBob , the values of the four cells for a player sum to 100). We highlight with rectangles the
cases that we discuss in Section 5.2.2.
the reported co-location at time t = 2 fades away over time, privacy increases, and at t = 5 the equilibrium also
maximizes social welfare.
Finally, in the FF model (Figure 8d), the equilibrium at times when the players are not co-located is always
(LC¯,LC¯): In this case, sharing their own location brings them some social benefits without any privacy costs (this
adversary cannot see if they share location). When players are co-located, the equilibrium is (LC¯,LC¯) (sharing
also the co-location would result in minimal privacy), and it maximizes both the social welfare and both the
players’ utilities.
5.2.2 The effect of privacy vs. benefits preferences. We present a heterogeneous scenario, where players place
different importance on privacy and social benefits. We consider the average values for fsv and flc and vary
fpb in [0, 1]. Figure 9 illustrates our results (see caption for details). Obviously, when players have different
values for fpb (recall that α = fpb ), their interests can be in conflict and decisions at equilibrium might differ:
When co-located (t = 2), one player might share only co-location, whereas the other shares both (e.g., in theMF
model when αAlice = 0.6 and αBob = 0.2 Bob shares both, while Alice shares only co-location5) or one shares his
location, whereas the other shares nothing (e.g., in theMF model when αAlice = 1 and αBob = 0.2 Alice shares
nothing, whereas Bob only shares his location).
5Recall that "share co-location" and "share both" decisions can only occur when the players are co-located (i.e., 20% of the times).
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 0.
The Sharing Game: Benefits and Privacy Implications of (Co)-Location Sharing with Interdependences • 0:17
An interesting observation is that, in the SP model, when the two players are co-located, the equilibria strategies
are always in the form of (L¯C¯, L¯C¯), (L¯C, L¯C) or (LC,LC). This stems from the fact that if one player wants to share
the co-location information, as the service provider automatically has access to it, the privacy of the other player
is already compromised and he is forced into sharing as well and at least obtains the associated social benefits. This
leads to equilibria in which one player’s utility, or even the social welfare, are not maximized. Such outcomes can
be avoided in the other models, where a player can undo the co-location shared by the other, and only equilibria
with strategies where both players share or do not share the co-location information are allowed. An example
can be observed in Figure 9, for αAlice = 0.8 and αBob = 0.2: In the SP model, Alice is forced into sharing her
location and co-location information at t = 2 because Bob, who places little importance on privacy, shares both,
and the equilibrium is (LC,LC); in the CF model, Alice does not allow Bob to post co-location information about
her and the equilibrium in this case becomes (L¯C¯,LC¯)–Alice shares nothing while Bob only shares his location.
Another observation is that, in all adversarial models, both players tend to share more as one or both
their α decreases (i.e., as one or both value privacy less). Notably, a player’s strategy can change, even when
only his friend’s preferences change. Let us look, for example, at the average case of αAlice = 0.6: As αBob
decreases from 1 to 0, the amount of sharing Alice does increases (e.g., in the FF model, Alice only shares her
location when αBob ∈ [0.2, 1], but she also shares the co-location when αBob = 0). The same observation holds for
the other values of αAlice . For the SP model, in particular, when Alice is very privacy conscious (αAlice = 1), her
preferred outcome when co-located would be to share nothing, but she can only do this when αBob = 1. She can
gradually be forced into sharing her co-location with Bob (when αBob ∈ [0.6, 0.8]) or even their co-location and
her location (when αBob ≤ 0.4). Furthermore, the propagation of this effect can be observed not only at times
where the players are co-located. Let us look, for example, at the case where αAlice = 0.2 and αBob = 0.6: In the
CFmodel, before his co-location with Alice (at t = 1)6, Bob decides to not share anything (20% of the times). Once
co-located, Bob and Alice have enough incentive to share both their co-location and location (20% of the times).
After their co-location, Alice still has incentive to share her location. Their previously reported co-location, as
well as Alice’s successive reports of her location, continue to damage Bob’s privacy, and he counteracts these
losses by also sharing his location for the benefits (60% of the times).
5.2.3 The effects of multiple users’ preferences. We present a more realistic setup, where each of the two
players’ parameters are assigned from the individual preference profiles of the survey participants. A preference
profile represents the values of all preference factors (fsv , flc , fpb ), for a specific survey participant; there are 250
such preference profiles. Analyzing the players’ behaviors is substantially more complicated, due to the multiple
influences present in such a complex setup. In order to find a meaningful interpretation, we alternatively split the
250 preference profiles into two subsets, based on the value of one of the preference factors.
The case of sharer / viewer players. We study how the fact that the players have different values for the
fsv preference factor affects their decisions. We select two subsets of preference profiles from our survey data:
the sharers (150 profiles)–for which fsv > 0.5–and the viewers (58 profiles)–for which fsv < 0.5. We evaluate
the outcome of the Sharing Game in three cases, for each possible pairs of preference profiles: when Alice has
a sharer’s preference profile and Bob a viewer’s, when both have sharers profiles and when both have viewers
profiles.
Figure 10 shows our aggregated results (see caption for details). We note that the interplay between the
various parameters of the preference profiles (e.g., a sharer profile encourages sharing because fsv > 0.5, but it
could also discourage sharing if fpb > 0.5) results in a large variety in the distribution of players’ equilibria
decisions. Despite this variability, a few trends are still distinguishable. First, in general, a sharer shares more
information than a viewer and the most information is shared when both Alice and Bob are sharers, whereas
6This detail is not directly readable form Figure 9, as it presents statistics aggregated over time instants.
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the least information is shared when both are viewers. Second, regardless of the players’ types (sharer/viewer),
and due to the forcing effect, the largest amount of co-location is shared in the SP model (e.g., 17% of all time
instants when both players are sharers); the smallest amount of co-location is shared in the FF model (e.g., 3.6% of
all time instants when both players are viewers), when players find it most beneficial to report few co-locations
and report their location most often (at no privacy cost). Furthermore, the equilibria decisions are frequently
socially-optimal: From 52% of the times (in the FF model, when both Alice and Bob are viewers) to 85% of the times
(in the CF model, when both Alice and Bob are sharers). Regardless of the adversary, the most socially-optimal
equilibria are reached when both players are sharers and the least when both players are viewers (due to the fact
that a viewer player shares less than a sharer player and, consequently, their opponent benefits less from their
posts).
The case of benefits-oriented / privacy-oriented players. We present the case where the players have
different values for the fpb factor. We select two subsets of preference profiles from our survey data: the privacy-
oriented (158 profiles)–for which fpb > 0.5–and the benefits-oriented (92 profiles)–for which fpb < 0.5. We
evaluate the outcome of the Sharing Game in three cases–when Alice is privacy-oriented and Bob is benefits-
oriented, when both are privacy-oriented and when both are benefits-oriented–for each possible pairs of preference
profiles.
Figure 11 illustrates our aggregated results (see caption for details). It is interesting that, when both players
are benefits-oriented, the amount of shared co-location is substantial: It is always shared in the SP, MF and
CF adversarial models (20% of all time instants), and is shared approximately 19.7% of all time instants in the
FF model.7 When one player is benefits-oriented and the other is privacy-oriented, the amount of shared co-
location varies significantly, with respect to the considered adversary: It is always shared in the SP case,
shared 5.4% of all time instants (27% of the time instants when the players are co-located) in the CF case, 10% of
all time instants in the MF case and only 2% of all time instants in the FF case. One reason for this behavior is
that the CF adversary has access to location information shared by both players, whereas the MF adversary only
has access to location shared by one of them, so privacy losses stemming from shared co-locations are higher in
the CF case, and thus less co-location information is shared. Interestingly, this also causes both players to share
their location more frequently in the CF case than in the MF case (in the CF case, it is enough that one
player share his location after a shared co-location, for both players’ privacy to be damaged, so the other player
would be forced to also share his location for some benefit). When both players are privacy-oriented, location
sharing is substantially reduced, but co-location is still shared 15% of all time instants in the SP case. The FF case
illustrates a naturally emerging countermeasure: In all the cases, players find it most beneficial to report few
co-locations (unlinking themselves from their friend makes the information unavailable to the FF adversary) and
report their location most often (at no privacy cost). The equilibria decisions are frequently socially-optimal: From
45% of the times (in the FF model, when Alice is benefits-oriented and Bob is privacy-oriented) to 99% of the times
(in the FF model, when Alice and Bob are benefits-oriented). We notice that the case of players having opposite
views regarding fpb is particularly problematic: Regardless of the considered adversary, this case presents the
least amount of socially-optimal equilibria decisions; furthermore, the utility of the benefits-oriented player is
rarely maximized because his opponent would seldom share or allow sharing; finally, misaligned preferences can
lead to different decisions for the players–they only make the same decision 24% of the times in the SP model,
19.2% in the CF model and 11.6% in the MF model.
7To infer these numbers from Figure 11, we sum the values for "co-location" and "both". As discussed in Section 5.2.2, in any adversarial
model, both players share the same amount of co-location.
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Fig. 10. Equilibria decisions (a) and their properties (b), when Alice and Bob have different preference profiles, corresponding
to real survey data: 150 sharers’ profiles (fsv > 0.5) and 58 viewers’ profiles (fsv < 0.5). We present three scenarios: both
Alice and Bob are sharers (left plots), Alice is a sharer and Bob is a viewer (middle plots) and both are viewers (right plots).
Note that, due to the symmetry of the trajectories in the meeting scenario, the case where Alice is a viewer and Bob is a
sharer is symmetric to the case where Alice is a sharer and Bob is a viewer. Different adversarial models (SP, CF, MF, FF) are
illustrated on the x axis. In each of the top three plots, for each adversarial model, two bars (blue on the left for Alice and
red on the right for Bob) indicate–on the y axis–the proportion of times (aggregated over time instants and the number of
preference profile pairs considered in that scenario) a player made one of the four possible decisions: share nothing (empty
pattern), share only location (hash right pattern), share only co-location (hash left pattern) or share both (hash right-left
pattern). Each of the three bottom plots show, on the y axis, for each adversarial model, the proportion of times social welfare
and individual utilities are maximized.
5.3 Experimental Conclusions
We conclude that the considered adversary has a strong influence on the users’ decisions, the value of α (fpb ,
the preference for privacy versus social benefits of one user) can also influence both users’ decisions, whereas
other model parameters have a more moderate effect. We observed some interesting patterns of behavior, such
as the fact that a vicious-circle effect can occur in the SP adversarial model: When a player (say Alice) has a
strong incentive to share, it is enough that she share one co-location information and, with respect to the service
provider, her friend (Bob)–who might not be willing to share at all–will continue to have his privacy affected and
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Fig. 11. Equilibria decisions (a) and their properties (b), when Alice and Bob have different preference profiles, corresponding
to real survey data: 92 benefits-oriented profiles (fpb < 0.5) and 158 privacy-oriented profiles (fpb > 0.5). We present three
scenarios: both Alice and Bob are benefits-oriented (left plots), Alice is benefits-oriented and Bob is privacy-oriented (middle
plots) and both are privacy-oriented (right plots). Note that, due to the symmetry of the trajectories in the meeting scenario,
the case where Alice is privacy-oriented and Bob is benefits-oriented is symmetric to the case where Alice is benefits-oriented
and Bob is privacy-oriented.
be forced into sharing his location at later times. This effect is made even worse if Alice still wants to share her
own location at other time instants, further damaging Bob’s privacy. It is evident that a sequence of meeting
scenarios between Alice and Bob, where Alice always shares their co-locations and sometimes shares her location,
can force Bob into a sharing behavior as well; this is because the effect propagates not only in space (influences
from a friend), but also in time. When the adversary is represented by the OSN friends, we observed that the effect
of a shared co-location can eventually fade away: If Bob does not want Alice to share a co-location, he can un-tag
himself and, assuming he does not want to share his location at later times, his privacy will be protected. However,
we showed that it is possible (e.g., in the SP and CF models) that a (common) decision to share co-location create
the incentive to over-share locations after the time of the co-location. This is an interesting finding from a design
perspective for the OSN service providers: Building and advertising features that allow the sharing of co-location
information, would also encourage users to share their locations more often. Finally, we noticed that, in the
FF model, a natural tendency for privacy concerned players is to share few co-locations but they still share a
significant amount of location information.
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6 DISCUSSION
This work represents the first step towards modeling the interplay between users in the context of (co-)location
sharing and the idea of combining a game-theoretic model with real user parameters in this setting is also novel.
As the first attempt to tackle the problem of understanding and predicting users’ interaction in such a complex
context, we focused on a number of specific scenarios and assumptions, which open several interesting directions
for future work.
(1) We considered players do not report fake co-locations. Including fake co-locations into the model is
straightforward, and simply increases the number of possible strategies at times where players are not
co-located. However, the benefit of sharing fake co-locations is likely different than that of sharing true
co-locations; we plan to carry out surveys to evaluate the benefit users gain for sharing fake co-locations
and include this kind of information into our model.
(2) We included in our evaluation location privacy evaluated with respect to one adversary at a time. As
adversaries are not easily separable and a user is likely sensitive to more than one type of the adversaries
that we mentioned, a combination of these different adversaries (with appropriate weights estimated through
similar conjoint analysis surveys) can be included in the utility function.
(3) We considered players are somewhat short-sighted in that, in their utility function, only social benefits
and privacy effects at the current time are considered. Having understood the basics of interplay at this
level, the model can now be extended to include a combination of benefits and privacy implications at all
time instants into the utility function–typically weighted by a discount factor, which makes the influence
of a player’s valuation of the game diminish with time (in other words, immediate benefits and privacy
implications weigh more than those in the distant past). However, doing this would also require further
surveys for quantification of users’ discount factors. We plan to carry this out in future work.
(4) We considered a game with two players. In doing so, we illustrated interdependence effects that work both
in time (actions at previous times influence a user’s future decisions for sharing) and in space (actions of a
friend influence a user’s decisions). To better illustrate the spacial effects, the framework can be extended to
more players and non-default visibility settings for posts; intuitively, we expect that the cascading effect (one
user’s behavior affecting that of her friends’, that of the friends of her friends, and so on and so forth) would
occur, with an even greater impact, with more players. However, the complicated dependencies introduced
by co-location information makes defining appropriate utility functions for the general N-player T-time
Sharing Game more challenging. In order to represent this game, as well as reduce the complexity of the
computation of its Nash equilibria, we propose to use multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs), which
were introduced by Koller et al. [24]. MAIDs were proposed for efficiently solving games, by a divide and
conquer approach: first splitting the problem into sub-problems which are independent of each other (in
the sense that they are strategically irrelevant to each other), and then combining their local equilibria to
obtain a global game equilibrium. We plan to explore this in future work.
(5) We considered location check-ins are similar for a user, in the sense of including only the associated location
privacy loss in the utility function. However, in practice (especially when combined with co-location),
a check-in at a hotel vs. a check-in in a park could bare different meanings. To this end, solutions for
predicting the utility/benefit8 of check-ins (such as that proposed by Bilogrevic et al. [9]) can be used to
associate a sensitivity factor with each check-in, in addition to the location privacy loss. Such a factor
would typically be inversely proportional to the predicted utility/benefit of the check-in.
(6) Beyond location, co-locations are by themselves sensitive information and can be used, for instance, to infer
private information about the users or expose social ties; our framework can be extended to support such
8Not to be confused with utility in the game theory sense. Utility here means benefit only.
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other quantifiable aspects of privacy and incorporate them into the utility function, with an appropriate
weight that can also be estimated through a conjoint analysis study.
(7) Our evaluation focused on the most interesting cases, while keeping the number of free parameters low. We
only quantified a limited number of preference factors in order to avoid the questionnaire fatigue effect that
would have decreased the quality of the participants’ responses. More preference factors can be evaluated
through similar user surveys (e.g., different values for fpb for the different adversarial models).
(8) Given the fact that social benefits and privacy are highly dependent on the culture, our sample of participants
is not necessarily representative of the global population as the vast majority of Mechanical Turk workers
are US-based [41]. To obtain more significant statistics, we intend to run user surveys with a more diverse
and targeted sample of participants.
(9) Having studied the basic interplay of human behavior, the next step towards a more complex and realistic
model would be to consider a cooperative/colaborative game-theoretic model (one can envision than a
cooperative mentality applies to friends [11, 21, 27, 45, 46, 52]) or to include altruism into the users’ utility
functions. To some extent, altruism is already implicitly included in our framework: The benefits of sharing
information include both the fact that users enjoy sharing, but also the fact that they are happy that their
friends enjoy viewing their posts. We could extend this in two ways: (i) Users care about their friends’
global utility; the utility of user j should be included in the expression of user i’s, weighted by an altruistic
factor as proposed in [30]; (ii) Users care about their friends’ privacy (their friends’ benefits are already
included in the sharing benefits); the privacy of user j should be included in the expression of user i’s,
weighted by an altruistic factor that can be estimated as in [38]. We plan to carry it out in future work.
Ultimately, our extensible model with quantifiable parameters can serve as the first building block to assist
and finally automate user decision making in an informed manner. Specifically, we envision that a software tool
(e.g., a Facebook extension) would use our framework to take these interactions into account and assist users to
improve their awareness and decision making process.
7 CONCLUSION
It is well-known that other people’s behaviors affect our own privacy, in particular in the case of interdependent
data. Yet, formalizing these complex interdependences and their implications is non-trivial, especially because
human decisions play a dominant role. To address this issue, we focused on the (co-)location sharing features
provided by major OSNs. We proposed a coarse-grained game-theoretic model and provided a first framework to
study the interplay between two friends. A major challenge in such approaches is to assign meaningful values
to the parameters that characterize user preferences. For this purpose, we carried out a survey of Facebook
users, which also confirmed the anticipated high diversity of opinions in terms of social benefits and location
privacy. We studied the resulting equilibria and their properties, in different settings. In particular, we showed
how, because of conflicting preferences, one of the users can be forced into a situation that she does not desire
and we demonstrated that sharing co-location information can additionally encourage users to over-share their
locations. In addition to already mentioned future work, we intend to develop appropriate warning mechanisms
to be run on smartphones; these would help users better understand and anticipate the consequences of their
(co-)location sharing decisions.
SURVEY TRANSCRIPT
In Figures 12 and 13, we provide the transcript of our survey.
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Part I: Demographics
(1) What is your gender?
⃝ Female ⃝ Male
(2) What is your age?
(3) What is your primary area of employment?
⃝ Homemaker ⃝ Retired ⃝ Student (undergraduate) [. . . ] ⃝ Transportation
⃝ Other:
Part II: Preferences
(4) A check-in post is a post in which location is disclosed, by checking-in at a point of interest like an airport, concert hall, square etc.
Imagine that, due to technical constraints, Facebook may have to remove some or all of your 2 most recent check-in posts (your
friends will not see these posts anymore) and/or some or all of your close friends’ 2 most recent check-in posts (you will not see
these posts anymore). Note that there are posts you and your friends already shared therefore you do not want Facebook to
delete any of them! (choose option "2 of your recent posts are kept and 2 of your friends’ recent posts are kept" as most preferred).
Order the following scenarios in decreasing order of preference. Click on an item in the list on the left, starting with your highest
ranking item, moving through to your lowest ranking item.
Your choices Your ranking
2 of your recent posts are kept and 2 of your friends’ recent posts are kept
1 of your recent posts are kept and 2 of your friends’ recent posts are kept
2 of your recent posts are kept and 1 of your friends’ recent posts are kept
2 of your recent posts are kept and 0 of your friends’ recent posts are kept
0 of your recent posts are kept and 1 of your friends’ recent posts are kept
1 of your recent posts are kept and 1 of your friends’ recent posts are kept
(5) A check-in post is a post in which location is disclosed. A co-location post is a post in which you tag the friends you are with -
either through a status message or a picture. Imagine that, due to technical constraints, Facebook may have to remove some or all
of your 2 most recent check-in posts and/or some or all of your 2 most recent co-location posts (think of posts in which you
either tag friends, or check-in, but not both). If removed, your friends will not see these posts anymore. Note that there are posts
you already shared therefore you do not want Facebook to delete any of them! (choose option "2 of your recent check-in posts
are kept and 2 of your recent co-location posts are kept" as most preferred). Order the following scenarios in decreasing order
of preference. Click on an item in the list on the left, starting with your highest ranking item, moving through to your lowest ranking.
Your choices Your ranking
2 of your recent check-in posts are kept and 0 of your recent co-location posts are kept
0 of your recent check-in posts are kept and 1 of your recent co-location posts are kept
1 of your recent check-in posts is kept and 1 of your recent co-location posts are kept
1 of your recent check-in posts is kept and 2 of your recent co-location posts are kept
2 of your recent check-in posts are kept and 1 of your recent co-location posts are kept
2 of your recent check-in posts are kept and 2 of your recent co-location posts are kept
Fig. 12. Transcript of our survey questionnaire (1/2).
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(6) We define location privacy as the precision with which someone (Facebook, your friends, or public observers) can guess your
location at any moment during the day. An average location privacy of 50 meters means that at any time during the day, your
location can be guessed as close as 50 meters from your real location. With each of your check-in posts, your location privacy can
change.
Order the following scenarios in decreasing order of preference. Click on an item in the list on the left, starting with your highest
ranking item, moving through to your lowest ranking item.
Your choices* Your ranking
19 posts for an average privacy of 200m
12 posts for an average privacy of 400m
5 posts for an average privacy of 830m
24 posts for an average privacy of 0m
0 posts for an average privacy of 1100m (1,1km)
10 posts for an average privacy of 610m
* These numbers were extracted from the experimental results presented in [34].
Part III: Social Networks Usage
(7) On average how many times per week do you use Facebook?
⃝ Several times per day ⃝ One time per day ⃝ A few days per week ⃝ One time per week ⃝ Less than one time
per week
(8) On average how many times per week do you check-in on Facebook? (A check-in post is a post in which location is disclosed.)
⃝ More than one time per day ⃝ One time per day ⃝ Once every few days ⃝ Once per week ⃝ Less than one
time per week
(9) On average how many times per week do you tag the friends that are with you on Facebook, in pictures or in statuses?
⃝ More than one time per day ⃝ One time per day ⃝ Once every few days ⃝ Once per week ⃝ Less than one
time per week
(10) How concerned are you about location privacy (i.e., the fact that someone can infer your more or less precise location at some
points in time)?
⃝ Very concerned ⃝ Moderately concerned ⃝ Not concerned
(11) Were you aware that check-ins or tagging your friends can decrease your location privacy and your friends’ location privacy?
⃝ I was aware they would impact my own privacy as well as my friends’ privacy
⃝ I was only aware they would impact my own privacy
⃝ I was not aware they have any effect on privacy
(12) Were you aware that the check-ins and tags that your friends post can decrease your location privacy?
⃝ Yes ⃝ No
(13) Imagine that you are at a venue with a friend, who just checked-in at this venue and tagged you in his post. In terms of your
location privacy, whom are you concerned about?
□ The friends that you have in common on Facebook □ Your other friends on Facebook (these are not friends of your friend)
□ Your friend’s other friends on Facebook (these are not your friends) □ Facebook □ None of the above
(14) Will the information you learned through this survey change your behavior on Facebook in any way? If so how?
Fig. 13. Transcript of our survey questionnaire (2/2).
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 0.
